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Solve a Problem
A recent study has found that rooks team up to get food in a cooperative
instrumental task, but they may have difficulties in understanding when
cooperation is necessary and how it works.Thomas Bugnyar
For us humans, cooperation is
a fundamental feature of our life,
essential for our societies and cultural
achievements. No wonder that
explaining the evolution of human
cooperation, its maintenance and its
cognitive underpinnings is one of the
hottest topics in science [1]. In the
animal kingdom, cooperation can take
many forms [2], from interactions
of genetically related individuals,
exemplified in eusocial insects such as
bees, ants and termites, to interactions
between different species, such as
the mutualisms observed between
ants and plants. Of particular interest
for cognitive scientists are systems
in which individuals flexibly decide
whether or not to cooperate in
a given situation and selectively
choose among potential cooperation
partners that possess different
qualities. Such flexible decisions have
been described for species of different
taxonomic groups, ranging from
mammals to birds and fish, that team
up for accessing food, raising young,
avoiding predators and defending
resources [3–5]. Well-known examples
are the cooperative hunting of
carnivores [6] and coalition formation
during fights in primates [7]. The
difficulty with these types of naturally
occurring cooperation is teasingapart different phenomena like
mutual attraction towards a
resource, coordination among
individuals, and understanding of
the others’ roles.
Experimental work on the cognitive
aspects of cooperation has focused
on problem solving in the foraging
context, with individuals working
together to gain access to food [8,9]
or taking turns in producing and
sharing food [10]. In these experiments
manipulations were made to: the
accessibility of food, so that it can be
reached without the help from others;
the distribution of food, so that it can or
cannot be shared with ease; and the
role and availability of partners, so that
different strategies are possible [11].
Depending on the paradigm,
individuals are thus tested for their
understanding of when cooperation is
necessary (if a goal can be achieved
alone), how cooperation works (who
is taking which role) and who is an
effective cooperation partner.
Surprisingly perhaps, studies have only
been conducted with a limited number
of species, mostly non-human
primates.
Seed et al. [12] have now reported
a novel and important advance in our
understanding of the cognitive
underpinnings of cooperation: they
have shown that the rook, a member
of the crow-family Corvidae, is capableof solving a cooperative instrumental
task (Figure 1) but apparently shows
little sensitivity to the need for
a partner. These results are interesting
in two ways: on the one hand, they
support the idea that corvids are able
problem solvers; but on the other hand,
they challenge the idea that the birds
have an understanding of the problem.
The latter is surprising: over the past
decade studies on social cognition
have described capacities in corvids,
such as tactically deceiving others or
judging the others’ perspective [13,14],
which rival those found in non-human
primates, even apes [15]. Importantly
for the new study [12], rooks live in
societies that differ from those of
most primates. They form long-term
affiliative relationships with one or two
individuals, who tend to support one
another during fights and regularly
share food [16]. Seed et al. [12]
therefore argue that rooks could be
expected to cooperate when accessing
food in an experimental setting. But
their reliance on a relatively small
network of valuable relationships
raises the possibility that their
understanding of cooperation is
different from that of primates such
as chimpanzees, who have access to
a large biological market [17], forming
short- and long-term relationships
with a varying number of individuals.
In their study, Seed et al. [12]
provided rooks with food on a platform
that was placed outside their cage but
could be reached by pulling on a string.
Because the string was threaded
through metal loops on the platform,
with both ends extending into the
test-compartment, pulling from only
one end was ineffective and resulted
in an unthreaded string; to successfully
Dispatch
R531move the platform, individuals had
to pull on both ends of the string
simultaneously [8]. Each of the eight
rooks participating in the experiment
was tested in two dyadic combinations.
Impressively, all pairs were able to
solve the task within a short time
period. Moreover, in a similar way to
primates [18], the pairs’ success in
reaching the reward by simultaneously
pulling the strings correlated with
the pairs’ mutual tolerance in a
food-sharing test, which was
conducted before and after the
cooperation test. But unlike primates
[18,19], the rooks’ propensity to
cooperate was not affected by
the distribution of food on the
platform — that is, by how easily one
individual could monopolize all items.
What is the cognitive mechanism
underlying the cooperation in this
set-up: do rooks understand that they
need a partner? A possible alternative
would be that tolerant individuals
merely direct their actions
simultaneously towards the reward
and successfully solve the task without
any understanding of the other’s
behaviour. Seed et al. [12] performed
two follow-up experiments to address
this question. In the delay test, one bird
of a dyad faced some resistance in
entering the experimental room, so
that the bird already at the apparatus
should delay pulling the string for theperiod of time it took his partner to
join him. In the choice test, individual
rooks could choose between two
platforms, one having the two ends of
the string next to each other, so that
it could be picked up by a single bird,
and the second having the two ends
of the string far apart, so that a
cooperation partner would be needed.
In both experiments, the rooks
performed as if they did not understand
the requirements of the task. In the
delay test, all birds pulled the string
without waiting for the partner. In the
choice test, four out of six birds
showed no preference for the
apparatus that could be manipulated
alone over the apparatus that required
the action of two birds. The authors
contrast the behaviour of rooks with
that of chimpanzees, which did wait for
a partner in a delay test [20], and
interpret the findings with a difference
in understanding of the partner’s
action.
Of course, it is difficult to draw firm
conclusions from a single study. Critics
might argue that the findings in
rooks and chimpanzees are hardly
comparable, because the time required
to wait for a partner was much shorter
in the apes than in the birds. Moreover,
two of the rooks did perform well in
the choice test, which, because of the
small sample size, corresponds to one
third of the individuals tested. Sincea high inter-individual variation is
typical for cognitive tasks, a bigger
sample size could have produced
different results. Although the authors
openly address these problems in the
paper, there is the danger that
a simplified interpretation like ‘primates
understand, corvids do not’ prevails
as the take-home message.
Nonetheless, Seed et al. [12] are to be
congratulated for opening up the field
for comparative research. Investigating
the cognitive underpinnings of
cooperation in mammalian and avian
species with similar paradigms is
relevant for our understanding of
convergent evolution [15]. Notably,
linking the species’ cooperative
abilities with the ideas of biological
market theory [17] has a high potential
and has already become the topic of
recent international funding
programmes.References
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A new study shows that the nervous syst
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The primary task of the nervous
system is to guide action. But in order
to move the body gracefully, the brain
needs to anticipate the forces and
torques that act on the joints. For
example, when we move only the
lower arm, we need to anticipate and
counteract the induced torques that
act on the upper, non-moving part of
the arm, to ensure stability of the
shoulder. This is a complicated
problem, as these torques depend on
the relative position of the joints, body
orientation with respect to gravity,
and on the dynamics of tools or other
objects we manipulate.
How does the brain solve this
problem? One suggestion is that the
brain learns an internal model of the
body’s dynamics by associating
the state of the body — it’s position,
velocity, joint angles, and so on — with
forces that arise depending on the
state of the limbs. This process has
been extensively investigated using
dynamic force fields. In a typical
experiment, participants move
a handle to a target position, while
a robotic device generates a position-
or velocity-dependent force on the arm.
At first, participants make large errors
that gradually decrease with further
exposure to the force field. If the force
field is unexpectedly removed, the
hand path deviates in the opposite
direction, indicating that the motor
control system learned to actively
compensate for the expected
forces [1].
But what exactly did the brain learn?
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representations. In a typical
generalization experiment, participants
learn to compensate for a force field
in one arm position, and then perform
similar movements in an unvisited
part of the workspace. If participants
learned to associate certain movement
velocities ( _x) with forces (F) in ‘extrinsic’
coordinates (Figure 1A), then they





Figure 1. Learning to compensate for force field
A force field (black arrows) pushes the hand righ
downward movements. (A) If participants learn t
tion in extrinsic space, changes in arm position
anticipated forces (grey arrows). (B) Conversely
coordinates, the anticipated forces rotate with t
learned as associates between neural element
(x, _x), joint angles (q; _q), and neural assemblies
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configuration (grey). If, on the other
hand, participants learned to associate
changes in joint angles (q) with
torques on those joints (t) — they
learned in an ‘intrinsic’ reference
frame— then they should expect forces
that are rotated with the joint
configuration (Figure1B).For learningof
force fields within a limb, the evidence
favours the idea that people learn in an
intrinsic coordinate system [1–3].
Thus, learning of force fields can be
thought of as the tuning of weights
between neuronal populations that
code for joint position and velocity, and
elements that code for joint torques or
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